Does Employment Protection Inhibit Labor Market Flexibility?
Lessons from Germany, France and Belgium
Upjohn Institute Staff Working Paper 93-16
Katharine G. Abraham and Susan N. Houseman
December 1992
Revised March 1993
JEL Codes: J23, J65, J83
Abstract
Laws in most West European countries give workers strong job rights, including the right
to advance notice of layoff and the right to severance pay or other compensation if laid off.
Many of these same countries also encourage hours adjustment in lieu of layoffs by providing
prorated unemployment compensation to workers on reduced hours.
This paper compares the adjustment of manufacturing employment and hours in West
Germany, France and Belgium, three countries with strong job security regulations and
well-established short-time compensation systems, with that in the United States. Although the
adjustment of employment to changes in output is much slower in the German, French and
Belgian manufacturing sectors than in U.S. manufacturing, the adjustment of total hours
worked is much more similar. The short-time system makes a significant contribution to
observed adjustment in all three European countries. In addition, we find little evidence that
the weakening of job security regulations that occurred in Germany, France and Belgium
during the 1980s affected employers' adjustment to changes in output.
These findings suggest that, given appropriate supporting institutions, strong job security
need not inhibit employer adjustment to changing conditions.
NOTE: A revised version of this paper was published in R. Blank, ed. Social Protection vs. Economic Flexibility: Is there a Trade-Off?. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. Please cite that chapter instead of this working paper.
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