The Role of Temporary Help Employment in Tight Labor Markets
Upjohn Institute Staff Working Paper 01-73
Susan N. Houseman
Senior Economist
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
e-mail:
houseman@we.upjohninst.org
Arne L. Kalleberg
University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
George A. Erickcek
Senior Regional Analyst
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
December 2000
last revision January 2003
JEL Classification Codes: J49, J21, J31
Abstract
This paper examines the reasons why employers used and even increased their use of temporary
help agencies during the tight labor markets of the 1990s.
Based on case study evidence from the hospital and auto supply industries, we evaluate various
hypotheses for this phenomenon. In high-skilled occupations, our results are consistent with the
view that employers paid substantially more to agency help to avoid raising wages for their
regular workers and to fill vacancies while they recruited workers for permanent positions. In
low-skilled occupations, our evidence suggests that temporary help agencies facilitated the use of
more "risky" workers by lowering their wages and benefits and the costs of firing them.
The use of agency temporaries in both high- and low-skilled occupations reduced the pressure on
companies to raise wages for existing employees, and thereby may have contributed to the
stagnant wage growth and low unemployment observed in the 1990s.
NOTE: A revised version of this paper was published in Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, Vol. 57, No. 1 (October
2003), pp. 105-127. Please cite that article instead of this working paper.